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OFFICER-CREATED JEOPARDY AND REASONABLENESS REFORM:
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF UNREASONABLENESS WITHIN
42 U.S.C. § 1983 POLICE USE OF FORCE CLAIMS
Bryan Borodkin*

ABSTRACT
This Note analyzes the current state of civil law surrounding police use of excessive
force, highlighting the evolution of the “objective reasonableness” test employed in civil
police use of force lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Note also discusses the
role that social movements and surveillance technologies have played in furthering police
accountability and shifting public opinion surrounding police use of force. After detailing
this social and technological context, this Note addresses the numerous problems
presented by the “objective reasonableness” test employed within civil police use of force
cases, analyzing this problematic test from the perspective of both the public and the
police. This Note coins the term “officer-created jeopardy liability loophole” and explains
how, under the current test, officer-defendants can escape § 1983 liability when they
deliberately or recklessly escalate a situation or create the need for force in the first place.
To close this liability loophole and resolve other problems presented by the current
“objective reasonableness” test, this Note proposes a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, in which a § 1983 plaintiff can present evidence to establish a prima facie
case of officer-created jeopardy which, if not sufficiently rebutted by an officer-defendant,
presumes the officer-defendant’s use of force unreasonable and in violation of § 1983.
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INTRODUCTION
Amy Hughes was shot four times by a police officer without warning and without being suspected of any crime. 1 In May of 2010, officers
responded to a call that a woman was “engaging in erratic behavior” and
“hacking a tree with a kitchen knife.” 2 Three officers arrived on scene
and drew their weapons soon after. 3 Officers soon saw Amy, who
matched the dispatch caller’s description, walking towards another
woman in the yard with a knife at her side, stopping about six feet away
from the woman. 4 Amy was calm, composed, and content. 5 Amy never
engaged in any erratic behavior. Amy committed no crime. Amy never
raised the knife in the direction of the other woman in the yard or the
police. 6 The police never warned Amy that force would be used against
her. 7 Despite this, Tucson Police Officer Andrew Kisela dropped to the
ground to create a clear line of fire and shot at Amy four times.8
After this shooting, officers discovered that the woman in the yard
with Amy was her roommate, Sharon Chadwick, and that Chadwick
was walking to her car to retrieve $20 that she owed to Amy.9 Officers

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1150–51 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1151.
Id. at 1151, 1155.
Id. at 1159 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1151 (majority opinion).
Id.
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also discovered that Amy had a significant history of mental illness. Although the officers claimed they opened fire because they believed Amy
posed a threat to Chadwick, Chadwick admitted that she never felt she
was in danger from the time Amy exited the house holding a knife to
the time responding officers opened fire, an ordeal that lasted a mere
minute. 10
Once she recovered from her injuries, Amy sued officer Kisela under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the primary statute cited in civil police use of force
cases, which prohibits the “deprivation of rights under the color of
law.” 11 In 2018, the Supreme Court held in favor of Officer Kisela, reversing the Ninth Circuit which had held Officer Kisela liable for violating Amy’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 12
Unfortunately, the story of Amy Hughes is the rule and not the exception. Officers can be held accountable for their unreasonable or excessive use of force under both federal criminal and civil law. Most civil
police use of force cases take the form of Amy Hughes’ case, as described above: plaintiffs file suit seeking to hold officers liable for depriving them of their Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. These
plaintiffs often fail. 13 On the other hand, in criminal police use of force
cases, the primary charge brought against police officers is also “deprivation of rights under [the] color of law,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §242. 14
As their titles suggest, the civil and criminal statutes cited in police use
of force lawsuits are incredibly similar. Both criminal and civil deprivation of rights statutes create liability for a person who, acting under the
color of law, deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 15
While several problems hinder plaintiffs from holding officers accountable for their unreasonable use of force under both criminal and
civil law, this Note focuses solely on reforming civil liability under 42

10. Id.
11. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
12. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1151–52 (majority opinion).
13. See Mawia Khogali, Redefining Standards of Excessive Force: Implications for Police and Practice,
12 S.J. POL’Y & JUST. 105, 110 (2018).
14. This statute provides, “[w]hoever, under color of any law . . . willfully subjects any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of
his color, or race . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 242.
15. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with 18 U.S.C. § 242.
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U.S.C. § 1983. 16 In civil police brutality cases brought under § 1983, federal courts analyze officer-defendants’ uses of force under an “‘objective
reasonableness’ standard,” “balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure against the important governmental
interests in effecting such seizure.” 17 Throughout this balancing, courts
determine whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable from the
perspective of another reasonable officer on the scene, rather than one
with the “20/20 vision of hindsight”. 18 This “objective reasonableness”
standard is far too deferential to police officers, placing emphasis on
the fact that “officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” 19 The “objective reasonableness” test also allows for the exclusion
of evidence regarding the officer-defendant’s pre-seizure conduct, the
conduct of such officer before the “split-second” when they used force
or effectuated an arrest. 20 This deferential standard results in frequent
failures to hold officers accountable for their unreasonable and excessive use of force, especially in situations of officer-created jeopardy.
16. Attempting to hold officers civilly liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 avoids many problems
associated with holding an officer criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 242. First, criminal charges
are less likely to be brought in the first place. In theory, any victim of police brutality or use of unreasonable or excessive force can bring a civil claim under § 1983 against the officer who used such
force. In contrast, criminal prosecutions of 18 U.S.C. § 242 must be brought by the Department of
Justice. Several scholars have noted reluctance to bring criminal charges against officers as both
the prosecutors and the prosecuted are members of law enforcement. Additionally, even if
brought, criminal liability is more difficult to prove at trial than civil liability. Criminal prosecutions entail a higher burden of proof, requiring prosecutors prove their case “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” In civil § 1983 cases, on the other hand, a plaintiff merely has to prove their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In addition to the higher burden for criminal liability, prosecutors
charging 18 U.S.C. § 242 must show that the officer-defendant acted willfully and that the deprivation in question was because of some racial or ethnic animus on behalf of the officer. See Amelia
Thomson-DeVeaux, Laura Bronner, & Damini Sharma, Cities Spend Millions on Police Misconduct Every
Year. Here’s Why It’s So Difficult to Hold Departments Accountable, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 22, 2021)
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/police-misconduct-costs-cities-millions-every-year-but-thatswhere-the-accountability-ends/ [https://perma.cc/QNP4-7LRY] (explaining how it is extremely rare
for police officers to face criminal prosecution and, when they do, it is even more rare that they
end up convicted as a result).
17. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388
(1989)); id. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703)).
18. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 396–97.
20. Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the Chain of Events in Excessive Force Claims,
8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 8 (2018) (Claiming that “[f]ollowing Graham v. Connor, lower courts were
left to interpret the relevant timeframe for evaluating an officer’s conduct under an excessive force
claim” and describing the different approaches that lower courts take regarding pre-seizure conduct); see also Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, Preseizure
Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (2018) (including the analysis of preseizure conduct in her proposed model statute).
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Officer-created jeopardy is a term hallmarked by criminologists to
describe situations in which officers create their own danger, often by
deliberately or recklessly escalating a situation throughout the moments leading up to the effectuation of an arrest, increasing the likelihood that fatal or excessive force will be used. 21 Under the current “objective reasonableness” standard within § 1983 analysis, officers can use
this concept of officer-created jeopardy to their advantage, escaping liability.
This Note argues for reforming civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1983
by embedding a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness within
the “objective reasonableness” test utilized by federal courts to ensure
that officer-created jeopardy generates, rather than inhibits, civil liability, leading to increased success for plaintiffs bringing civil police brutality suits. Under this proposed framework, an officer-defendant’s use
of force would be presumed unreasonable and in violation of § 1983 if
the officer deliberately or recklessly escalated the situation or otherwise
increased the likelihood of force throughout their pre-seizure conduct.
An officer-defendant could rebut this presumption by showing that
they sufficiently de-escalated the situation before using force.
Part I of this Note describes the evolution of the “objective reasonableness” test employed in § 1983 civil police use of force lawsuits and explains how surveillance technologies and social movements have increased societal focus on holding police accountable for their use of
unreasonable force. Part II of this Note describes problems associated
with the current “objective reasonableness” test employed within § 1983
civil suits, both from the perspective of the general public and the police. This Part concludes by discussing recent Supreme Court decisions
that have opened the door to reforming this test and, generally, reforming civil liability for police uses of force. Lastly, Part III of this Note
proposes a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness within civil police use of force cases, responding to counterarguments and explaining
how this reform would benefit both the public and the police.

21. See Cynthia Lee, Officer-Created Jeopardy: Broadening the Time Frame for Assessing a Police
Officer’s Use of Deadly Force, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1362, 1388–89 (2021); Robin Stein, Haley Willis
Brenna Smith, Natalie Reneau, Rumsey Taylor, David Kirkpatrick, Steve Eder, Kim Barker &
Michael Beswetherick, Before the Final Frame: When Police Missteps Create Danger, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/10/30/video/police-traffic-stops-danger-video.html
[https://perma.cc/G7GT-4EUC] (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).

924

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:4

I. THE CURRENT STATE OF POLICE USE OF FORCE CIVIL SUITS

A. The History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Evolution of the
“Objective Reasonableness” Test
On July 9th, 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was ratified. 22 This amendment provided for, among other protections, the “equal protection of the laws.”23 In the proceeding
years, however, this protection had far more bark than bite; states
seemingly failed to provide equal protection to citizens while the Ku
Klux Klan created a state of lawlessness and terror within the American
South. 24 In response to widespread racial violence sparked by the Ku
Klux Klan as well as states’ failure to effectuate the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871.25
This Act, also commonly referred to as the “Ku Klux Klan Act,” was the
third in a series of Enforcement Acts created by Congress to provide for
and protect previously enslaved persons who were newly freed by the
Thirteenth Amendment, and was adopted in January of 1865.26
Most relevant to this Note is the very first section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of [law] . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
22. LIBR. OF CONG., 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Primary Documents in American
History, https://guides.loc.gov/14th-amendment [https://perma.cc/6V7K-9CXP] (last visited Nov.
14, 2021).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
24. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961); The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871,
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/EnforcementActs.htm
[https://perma.cc/2QXQ-K3WS] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
25. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174–75; Catherine E. Smith, (Un)Masking Race-Based Intracorporate Conspiracies Under the Ku Klux Klan Act, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 130 (2003).
26. Nicholas Mosvick, Looking Back at the Ku Klux Klan Act, INTERACTIVE CONST. (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/blog/looking-back-at-the-ku-klux-klan-act
[https://perma.cc/VMT5-7FRG].
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against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated . . . . 27
Police use of force civil lawsuits are brought under § 1983 as there is
no separate federal statute governing such claims. 28 Civil plaintiffs can
bring § 1983 claims against law enforcement officers for using excessive
force, thus depriving them of their constitutional rights while acting
under the color of law. The Supreme Court employs an “objective reasonableness” test when assessing the use of force in question within a §
1983 claim. This test, much like § 1983 analysis as a whole, has evolved
and varied throughout federal precedent. Three landmark Supreme
Court cases—Tennessee v. Garner, Graham v. Connor, and Scott v. Harris—
have created and shaped this “objective reasonableness” test. 29
The Supreme Court decided the first of these cases, Tennessee v.
Garner, in 1985. Memphis police responded to a dispatch call from a
woman claiming that she heard “glass breaking and that . . . ‘someone’
was breaking in[to]” her neighbor’s house. 30 Once on scene, a responding officer heard a door slam and saw someone run across the backyard
of the house in question. 31 The officer followed and, using a flashlight,
saw that the fleeing suspect was unarmed. 32 The officer identified himself as a police officer and told the suspect to “halt”, but the suspect began to climb over a fence that bordered the property. 33 Fearful that the
suspect would evade capture if he made it over the fence, the responding officer fatally shot the suspect in the back of the head. 34
The decedent’s father brought suit under § 1983, arguing that the
officer deprived his son of rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 35 The defense argued that the responding officer properly acted in accordance with Tennessee law,
which stated that “if, after notice of the intention to arrest the [suspect],
he either flee[s] or forcibly resist[s], the officer may use all the necessary
means to effect the arrest.” 36 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
appellee father and held this Tennessee law unconstitutional insofar as

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Lee, supra note 20, at 640.
See id. at 641.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
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it erroneously authorized the use of deadly force against an unarmed,
non-dangerous, fleeing suspect. 37 The Court further held that deadly
force cannot be used against a fleeing suspect unless the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to themselves or others. 38 Notably, in
reaching this holding, the Supreme Court applied a Fourth Amendment
balancing test, asking whether the force was justified under the totality
of the circumstances and weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the citizen’s interest in their Fourth Amendment rights against
the government interest in the intrusion itself. 39
The Court “ma[d]e explicit what was implicit in [Garner]” just four
years later in Graham v. Connor, the second of the police use of force tridoctrine. 40 In Graham, the Court held that all § 1983 police use of force
claims are to be analyzed under the “Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard” 41 and delegated significant deference to police
officers throughout the application of this standard.
Dethorne Graham, the plaintiff-appellant, was a diabetic who went
to a convenience store to purchase orange juice at onset of an insulin
reaction. 42 When he realized the length of the line inside the store, Graham quickly left. 43 An observing officer grew suspicious of Graham’s
movements and followed Graham as he drove away from the store with
his friend. 44 Soon after, the officer pulled Graham and his friend over
and prevented the two from leaving until the officer “found out what
. . . happened at the convenience store.” 45 Graham’s friend informed the
officers that Graham was diabetic and Graham soon after lost consciousness. 46 While unconscious, officers rolled Graham over and
handcuffed him tightly.47 When Graham woke up, he told officers to
check his diabetic medical alert card. 48 Officers refused and, instead,
threw him headfirst into a squad car. 49 After determining Graham had
done nothing wrong, officers released him. 50
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 7–9.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Due to the officers’ use of force, Graham suffered cut wrists, a
bruised forehead, a broken foot, an injured shoulder, and permanent
ringing in his ears. 51 Graham filed suit against the responding officers
under § 1983, arguing that their use of force deprived him of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 52 The Supreme Court, finding
that the Fourth Circuit applied the wrong legal standard in finding for
the officers, remanded the case and instructed the Fourth Circuit (and,
in effect, all federal courts) to apply the Fourth Amendment’s “objective
reasonableness” test when analyzing § 1983 police use of force claims.53
The “objective reasonableness” test employed by the Graham Court
is nuanced. In reaching its holding, the Court emphasized that “§ 1983
‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” 54 Thus, in deciding § 1983 claims, federal courts must first identify the specific constitutional right allegedly deprived by the officer. 55 The Court claimed that
§ 1983 claims involving police use of force, specifically, are “most
properly characterized . . . as invoking” the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 56 Importantly, the Court
declined to set rigid guidelines for police use of force and instead stated
that, when determining whether an officer’s force is “reasonable” under
the Fourth Amendment, courts must carefully balance “the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the countervailing government interests at stake.” 57 The Court
went on to note three relevant factors that federal courts can look to
when employing such a balancing test: (1) “the severity of the crime at
issue;” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others;” and (3) “whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 58
The Court went on to define the deferential contours of this test,
claiming that the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

51. Id. at 390.
52. Id. at 386.
53. Id. at 395.
54. Id. at 393–94.
55. Id. at 394 (noting that “In most instances, [the right] will be either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures . . . or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishments.”).
56. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1985)); Lee, supra
note 20, at 644, 647 (describing how the Graham Court’s listed factors to be weighed in the Fourth
Amendment “objective reasonableness” test provide little actual guidance to practitioners).
58. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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than after the fact with the “20/20 vision of hindsight.” 59 Further, the
Court noted that this test must allow for the fact that “police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgements—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force
that is necessary in a particular situation.” 60
However, the Court dismissed these factors in the most recent
landmark § 1983 police use of force case, Scott v. Harris, decided in 2007.
Victor Harris was traveling at seventy-three miles per hour on a road
with a fifty-five miles per hour speed limit.61 When officers attempted
to pull Harris over, he sped off and a high-speed chase ensued. 62 About
six minutes after the chase began, Officer Timothy Scott, in efforts to
end the chase, engaged in a Precision Intervention Technique maneuver, designed to cause fleeing vehicles to spin to a stop. 63 As a result,
Victor Harris was severely injured and rendered a quadriplegic. 64 Harris
brought suit against Officer Scott, alleging a violation of § 1983. 65
While the district and appellate courts denied Officer Scott’s qualified immunity claims in favor of Harris, the Supreme Court reversed
and held that Officer Scott did not deprive Harris of his Fourth
Amendment rights and that his use of force, therefore, was not in violation of § 1983. 66 Notably, in reaching this holding, the Court declined to
apply Garner to Harris’ claim, stating that Garner itself was actually an
application of the Graham Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” test rather than a bright line rule for police officers deciding
whether and how to use force against a fleeing suspect. 67 One may think
that this part of the Harris opinion cements that Graham’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard applies to all § 1983 police use of force cases. However, further reasoning
in Harris reaches the opposite conclusion. Although the Court in Harris
balanced Harris’ interest against intrusion on his Fourth Amendment
rights against the government’s interests in the intrusion itself, the
Court never analyzed the other Graham factors, nor did the Court cite
Graham in its application of the reasonableness balancing test. 68 There-

59. Id.
60. Id. at 396–97.
61. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 381.
67. See id. at 382; Lee, supra note 20, at 648.
68. See Harris, 550 U.S. at 384; Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 1119, 1136 (2008).
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fore, Harris “not only emasculated Garner, but in the same paragraph—
without comment or analysis—implicitly dismissed the factors articulated in Graham as central to analyzing reasonableness.” 69
As a result, it is not entirely clear how one should assess whether an
officer’s use of force is excessive or unreasonable in violation of § 1983.
We know that, under the “objective reasonableness” test, courts must,
in some form, balance the individual plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interest against the government’s interest in exercising the force in question. However, after Scott, federal courts have few guideposts other
than looking to the “totality of the circumstances” 70 when employing
this balancing test. Thus, lower courts can decide what officer conduct
should be analyzed. Importantly, lower courts can choose whether to
analyze the officer’s pre-seizure conduct, actions taken before using
force against the plaintiff, or disregard it entirely, and instead analyze
merely the officer’s actions in the moment that force was used or the
moments immediately prior. 71 Lower courts can also largely decide how
this conduct should be analyzed, so long as they still ground their analysis in Graham and Harris. Before turning to the problems that the murkiness of the current § 1983 “objective reasonableness” test creates for
both the public and the police, it is important to pause and highlight
how now, more than ever, clarity and balance are desperately needed in
the federal test governing police use of force claims under § 1983.

69. Harmon, supra note 68.
70. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985).
71. Many scholars have addressed the circuit split pertaining to pre-seizure conduct analysis
in § 1983 claims. See, e.g., McClellan, supra note 20 (arguing that courts should consider pre-seizure
conduct when the officer predictably causes the suspect to respond by employing an overly aggressive tactic); Timothy P. Flynn & Robert K. Homant, Suicide by Police in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of
Police Tactics 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555 (2000); Evelyn Michalos, Time Over Matter: Measuring the
Reasonableness of Officer Conduct in § 1983 Claims, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 (2020) (concluding that the
Third Circuit approach considering pre-seizure conduct is “truest to the notion of ‘totality’” and
should be controlling); Lee, supra note 20 (proposing a model statute to govern police use of force
and listing pre-seizure conduct as one of three relevant factors under this statute); Arthur H. Garrison, Criminal Culpability, Civil Liability, and Police Created Danger: Why and How the Fourth Amendment Provides Very Limited Protection from Police Use of Deadly Force, 28 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 241
(2018); Seth W. Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 7
EMORY L.J. 521, 557 (2021).
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B. Body Cameras and Black Lives Matter: The Rise in Police Accountability
through Social Movements and Technology
Police accountability now occupies a sizable societal spotlight, due
in large part to increases in surveillance and social technological capabilities, and the amplification of the Black Lives Matter movement. 72
Within the past four years, the use of surveillance technology by police has rapidly accelerated. 73 Due to an increased pool of federal funding and the fact that the increased acquisition of surveillance technology by municipalities is largely unilateral and secretive, local police
departments and governments have exponentially expanded their surveillance capabilities. 74 Police surveillance technology can take many
forms including, but not limited to, body cameras worn by officers, automated license plate readers, facial recognition software, cell phone
trackers, and drones. 75 Although improvements to surveillance technology can bolster police accountability, the increased acquisition of these
surveillance technologies by police has prompted an increase in public
and scholarly scrutiny regarding potential privacy ramifications and the
ability of police to abuse this increased surveillance technological capability. 76
This Note does not attempt to weigh in on this debate. However, it
is important to highlight how increased surveillance technologies within police departments have led to an increase in police officers being
held legally accountable for their uses of force and, within Part III, how
surveillance technologies employed by police officers could serve as a
source of evidence in situations of officer-created jeopardy when a §

72. See generally Thomson-DeVeaux et al., supra note 16.
73. Chad Marlow, The People, Not the Police Should Decide If and How Surveillance Technologies
Are Used in Their Communities, ACLU (May 25, 2021) https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-lawreform/the-people-not-the-police-should-decide-if-and-how-surveillance-technologies-are-usedin-their-communities/ [https://perma.cc/HJM9-JP5P].
74. See id.; Candice Norwood, Body Cameras Are Seen as Key to Police Reform. But Do They Increase
Accountability?, PBS (June 25, 2020) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/body-cameras-are-seenas-key-to-police-reform-but-do-they-increase-accountability [https://perma.cc/MC22-92XK].
75. See Dave Davies, Surveillance and Local Police: How Technology is Evolving Faster than Regulation, NPR (Jan. 27, 2021) https://www.npr.org/2021/01/27/961103187/surveillance-and-local-policehow-technology-is-evolving-faster-than-regulation [https://perma.cc/F5Z4-MTYD].
76. See, e.g., id. (noting the lack of regulation accompanying the increase in police surveillance
technology); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for
Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public 66 EMORY L. J. 527, 530 (2017) (arguing that existing case
law can be re-interpreted to reconcile Fourth Amendment privacy concerns associated with increased technologies); Rebecca Heilweil, Why We Don’t Know as Much as We Should About Police Surveillance Technology, VOX (Feb. 5, 2020) https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/5/21120404/policedepartments-artificial-intelligence-public-records [https://perma.cc/PK5H-B44T] (discussing how
police surveillance technology exacerbates racial biases).
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1983 plaintiff is attempting to establish a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness.
First and most intuitively, the increased scrutiny of police use of
surveillance technology has correspondingly increased discussions of
police accountability among the general public and the media. Secondly, the expansion of police surveillance technology has led to increased
success for police prosecutions and civil plaintiffs filing suit under §
1983. 77 Without actual evidence of the use of force, which body camera
footage supplies, civil police use of force cases under § 1983 often turn
on the word of the plaintiff—whose interaction with police was likely
prompted by the plaintiff being suspected of a crime—against the word
of a “trusted” member of a police department. Footage of force and, in
jurisdictions that analyze it, footage of officer pre-seizure conduct, can
bolster plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, creating a larger incentive to litigate
cases and bring suits in the first place. 78 In the criminal context, body
camera footage has recently played a vital role in the successful prosecutions of numerous police officers for their excessive uses of force. 79
Similarly, this surveillance technology can provide critical proof of officers’ use of excessive force within § 1983 civil suits. It should be noted,
however, that body cameras themselves will likely not lead to increased
justice for police brutality victims. Research into the effectiveness of
body camera footage in decreasing instances of deadly force inflicted by
police and increasing the likelihood that officers are held legally accountable for their force has been “mixed at best.” 80 However, this
Note’s proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness in situations of officer-created jeopardy, coupled with increased surveillance
technologies, may lead to increased justice for police brutality victims
who file § 1983 suits.
Non-surveillance technology has also played a large role in increasing public pressure in favor of police accountability. Increased social
and statistical technology has allowed civil rights and criminal justice
77. See Thomson-DeVeaux et al., supra note 16.
78. See Reha Kansara, Black Lives Matter: Can Viral Videos Stop Police Brutality? BBC NEWS (July 6,
2020) https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-53239123 [https://perma.cc/D4PK-9Q93] (“There
is a ‘huge increase’ in the number of clients [claiming excessive force] who are coming in with filmed
evidence.”).
79. Id.
80. Norwood, supra note 74; Jennifer Lee, Will Body Cameras Help End Police Violence?, ACLU
WASHINGTON, (June 7, 2021), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/%C2%A0will-body-cameras-help-endpolice-violence%C2%A0 [https://perma.cc/XQ58-YGR5] (describing how a comprehensive review of
empirical studies found that body cameras “have not had statistically significant or consistent effects in decreasing police use of force” and noting another study which revealed that 92.6% of prosecutor’s offices in jurisdictions with body cameras have used footage to prosecute civilians while
only 8.3% have used footage to prosecute police officers).
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reform nonprofits to create open-source online databases that increase
the visibility and transparency of police interactions involving officer use
of force. 81 These technologies can often serve as the “first step” in reform
movements, giving the public and the police a clearer perspective when it
comes to policing patterns. 82 Improved social technology capabilities
have also contributed to the increased societal spotlight on police accountability. Social media has played an increasingly large role in police
accountability, allowing victims of police brutality to share their stories,
connect with advocates, and put pressure on police departments through
“viral” videos depicting police violence and legal injustice. 83 The significant impact of social and news media in sharpening societal focus on police accountability can be seen through an historical analysis of the Black
Lives Matter movement.
The Black Lives Matter movement (“BLM”) has its roots in social media itself. 84 In 2013, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi created the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter to organize against police brutality after the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the shooting of Trayvon
Martin. 85 Since its inception, BLM has amplified into the single largest
social justice movement in American history. 86 This historic amplification cannot be discussed without reference to the murder of George
Floyd at the knee of Officer Dereck Chauvin. In the week following
Floyd’s murder, “#BlackLivesMatter was used almost fifty million times
on Twitter alone.” 87 This social media campaign put pressure on investigators and catalyzed criminal charges against Officer Chauvin, resulting
in his eventual conviction. 88 Aside from the Chauvin trial, BLM’s social
81. See Josiah Bates, Can a New, Open-Source Police Brutality Database Help to Hold Police Departments Accountable?, TIME (Feb. 11, 2021), https://time.com/5938038/accountable-now-police-forcedatabase/ [https://perma.cc/TZ8G-N854]. The database that this article refers to, Accountable Now,
can be accessed at https://www.accountablenow.com/ [https://perma.cc/39FG-GDTD].
82. See id.
83. See Kansara, supra note 78 (noting that “[w]hen black people are picking up their cell
phones, they’re not just recording in the wrong place at the wrong time. They’re attempting to
connect, historically, dots between atrocities” and describing police brutality cases involving viral
videos).
84. See generally Francesca Santoro, More than Just a Hashtag: The Influence of Social Media on the
Societal Change of the Black Lives Matter Movement, SUFFOLK U. L. SCH. J. HIGH TECH. L. (Sep. 25, 2020).
https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2020/09/25/more-than-just-a-hashtag-the-influence-of-social-mediaon-the-societal-change-of-the-black-lives-matter-movement/ [https://perma.cc/UF3T-QD3T].
85. Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk_
_=Kvac48.l4hKd6elolcWc6uU9ZGfg7e4i3.KwjAVjUKU-1636935791-0-gaNycGzNCL0 [https://perma.cc
/CHL8-G757] (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
86. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07
/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/A68C-75WE].
87. Santoro, supra note 84.
88. See id.
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media presence has propelled protests in every state and secured funding
for the legal representation of numerous victims of police use of excessive
force. 89 The recent amplification of BLM has also prompted media outlets
to shift their police use of force coverage, focusing on demonstrators and
police violence victims rather than police accounts and concerns about
property damage. 90 As a result of BLM and media technology, news outlets report more in-depth stories about police use of force victims, without fixating on victims’ pasts to highlight criminality. 91
Increased use of surveillance and social technology, coupled with
and reinforcing the BLM movement, has increased the likelihood that §
1983 claims are litigated and has increased the public attention, and shifted the public perception, that these cases receive. The increased frequency of these socially salient lawsuits warrants timely reform of the § 1983
“objective reasonableness” 92 standard to prevent problems faced by the
public and the police under the current standard.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE “OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS” TEST EMPLOYED IN
§ 1983 POLICE USE OF FORCE CASES
This Part articulates several of the primary problems with the current “objective reasonableness” standard employed in § 1983 police use
of force claims from the perspective of the public and police alike. This
Part concludes by discussing a recent Supreme Court decision that
highlighted some of these problems and opened the door for the reform
proposed in Part III.
A. From the Public’s Perspective
As discussed in Part II above, the public has grown increasingly concerned with police accountability and how police officers use force to effectuate an arrest. Police use of force claims brought by civil plaintiffs
who have been victimized by this force are increasingly common. However, legal success for these victims remains incredibly rare due to three
key problems under the current “objective reasonableness” test: (1) the inherent implicit bias against plaintiffs of color; (2) the inherent deference
89.
90.

Id.
Adeshina Emmanuel, Spurred by Black Lives Matter, Coverage of Police Violence is Changing,
INJUSTICEWATCH (Feb. 1, 2021) https://www.injusticewatch.org/longreads/2021/nieman-reportspolice-violence-coverage-is-changing/ [https://perma.cc/G5PM-VP87].
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
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in favor of police; and, most importantly, (3) the officer-created jeopardy
liability loophole.
First, the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” test employed throughout § 1983 police use of force civil suits is inherently biased against minority communities and plaintiffs of color. 93 When a
court balances a civil plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interest to be free
from an unreasonable search and seizure against the officer’s “important” interest in using force to effectuate an arrest, this balance is
often off-kilter due to implicit bias.
Implicit bias enters the analysis far before a civil plaintiff brings
suit under § 1983. Indeed, implicit bias can be present at the onset of
nearly all public interactions with police. 94 When confronted with a situation in which the use of force, lethal or otherwise, may be needed,
police officers make a personal and subjective determination about the
dangerousness of the individual before them. 95 However, dangerousness
can be influenced by implicit biases. 96 Indeed, “these biases can influence more than just perceptions-they can directly influence behaviors as
well.”97 The tendency of implicit biases to influence perceptions of dangerousness coupled with the resulting police behavior causes problems
throughout police-public interactions. This Note does not argue that all
police perceptions or actions are problematic due to implicit bias, nor
does this Note argue that police are more implicitly biased than members of the general public. On the contrary, this Note acknowledges that
implicit bias is present on both sides of the aisle when the public and police interact. 98 It is important to highlight, however, that there is often a
93. Jerry Kang, Judge Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David
Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias
in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135–37 (2012) (“[B]iases could shape whether an officer decides to stop and individual for questioning in the first place, elects to interrogate briefly or at
length, decides to frisk the individual, and concludes the encounter with an arrest versus a warning.”); see L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 293 (2012) (demonstrating how reasonableness standards, in the context of self-defense and
stop-and-frisk, are inherently biased against the Black community); see also Khogali, supra note 13,
at 110.
94. See Megan Quattlebaum, Let’s Get Real: Behavioral Realism, Implicit Bias, and the Reasonable
Police Officer, 14 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 1, 7–10 (2018); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth
Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2048–52 (discussing biased treatment resulting from implicit
bias in a variety of scenarios).
95. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–85 (2007) (explaining how the responding officer’s
use of force was lawful because, in part, the officer was reasonable in concluding that Harris was
dangerous, posing an imminent threat to the lives of pedestrians and officers alike).
96. Richardson & Goff, supra note 93, at 305.
97. Id.
98. Richardson, supra note 94, at 2039 (“The science of implicit social cognition demonstrates
that individuals of all races have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes and prejudices that can
negatively and nonconscious affect behavior. . . .”).
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vast power imbalance that exists within these interactions, 99 as responding police officers have the means to readily deploy lethal force if they
perceive that such force is justified or otherwise necessary due to their
subjective perceptions of “dangerousness.” 100 Implicit bias can taint this
perception.
Implicit bias and its ability to influence behavior is just as present
within the courtroom and the current “objective reasonableness” test
itself. Doctrines of reasonableness, generally, “are inherently biased
against particular groups . . . because of biases that influence the way
individuals perceive people as suspicious.”101 Essentially, reasonableness standards, like those employed for criminal and civil police use of
force cases, do not recognize “the systematic errors caused by racial stereotypes that can effect judgements of criminality” and “[a]s a result,
these [standards] often fail to protect those individuals who have the
misfortune to be stereotyped . . . .” 102 Unfortunately, the objectivity of
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard employed in § 1983
police use of force cases compounds this misfortune. Due to its focus
on objective rather than subjective officer intent, officers can escape liability despite subjective racially discriminatory motivations, so long as
their use of force was objectively reasonable. 103 Some scholars have even
gone as far to say that recent Supreme Court decisions employing this
“objective reasonableness” test have essentially made racial discrimination constitutionally “reasonable.” 104
It is also important to note that implicit bias within courtrooms is not
siloed to cases involving police use of force. Aside from § 1983 claims,

99. See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L. J. 778 (2021) (discussing police reform which would balance, rather than exacerbate, current power imbalances that
exist between the police and the public).
100. Recall the § 1983 use of force tri-doctrine of Garner, Graham, and Harris. The victims of
police use of lethal or otherwise excessive force in each of these cases were young Black men. All
three victims were unarmed. In Garner, the victim was fatally shot in the back of the head because
he was fleeing, posing a potential danger to others after evasion. In Graham, the victim was subject
to excessive force because he looked “suspicious” to an officer who saw him inside a convenience
store. In Harris, the victim was rendered permanently disabled because he was perceived as dangerous throughout a high-speed chase.
101. Khogali, supra note 13, at 111.
102. Richardson & Goff, supra note 93, at 296.
103. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”).
104. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882 (2015) (discussing
racial disparities within the Fourth amendment objective reasonableness standard within criminal
law).
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implicit bias and racial discrimination are “pervasive,” “large in magnitude,” and have substantial “real world effects” within the American legal system. 105 Factfinders within any courtroom bring with them implicit biases, some of which can target individuals of certain races or
individuals with prior, unrelated criminal convictions. 106 Scholars,
judges, and practitioners have begun to recognize how implicit biases
within numerous facets of the legal system influence legal outcomes for
persons of color. 107 Although implicit biases impact § 1983 police use of
force claims in several unique ways, these impacts are a part of a far
broader problem within the American legal system.
In addition to implicit bias, the second key problem of the current
“objective reasonableness” test is its inherent deference to the police
and officer-defendants. Despite the “balancing” that occurs within this
test, the scales are set in favor of the police. The possibility of implicit
bias tainting § 1983 claims against the plaintiff and in favor of the police
compounds an already deferential standard in favor of the officerdefendant. 108 The deference police are afforded, however, is no accident. In creating the “objective reasonableness” test employed in § 1983
police use of force claims, the Supreme Court noted that this test
“must” allow for “the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgements-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”109 This allowance is in accordance with the “arche105. Kang et al., supra note 93, at 1126.
106. See Richardson, supra note 94, at 2039.
107. Several scholars have noted the problem of implicit bias within the American legal system
and have proposed solutions. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 93 (detailing several approaches to
combat implicit bias in the courtroom, including jury instructions and pledges); Anna Roberts,
(Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 831 (2012)
(arguing that jurors should complete implicit bias training throughout orientation); Melissa L.
Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit Bias, Judicial Diversity, and the Bench Trial, 53 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1071 (2019) (arguing that judges who have been discriminated against are more
amenable to eradicating their own implicit biases and urging for further research); Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennet & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 97–110 (2017) (highlighting the results of a study which found five implicit
bias patterns held by different types of judges). Some judges and practitioners have noticed the
problem of implicit bias within the American legal system and have made strides to combat this
problem as well. For example, Circuit Judge Bennett of the Ninth Circuit spends approximately
twenty-five minutes discussing implicit bias during jury selection, asking each potential juror to
pledge that they will not decide the case based on biases. Kang et al., supra note 93, at 1181–82.
Judge Bennet also gives a specific jury instruction on implicit biases prior to opening statements.
Id.
108. Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 955–57 (2017); Barry Freidman &
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1883 (2015) (noting that courts “all
too readily defer” to the judgments of police officers).
109. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 296–97 (1989).
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type of police officers as good-hearted heroes who do no wrong,” a commonly held view among “members of the American racial majority.” 110
Deference to police decision-making and valorization of police officers may be based, in part, on the popular perception in American society that law enforcement is extremely dangerous work and that police
officers are “under constant threat of attack.” 111 While policing can certainly be dangerous, many of the dangers associated with police work
are drastically exaggerated. 112 Traffic stops provide a clear example of
this exaggeration. Officers are told throughout their training, and society largely believes, that traffic stops are “highly dangerous” to officer
safety. 113 Even the Supreme Court has noted the “inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.” 114
Reality does not reflect this risk, however. Out of over twenty-six million
traffic stops made in 2011, eleven officers were killed. 115 Statistically, officers have a “0.00004% chance of being killed during a traffic stop,”
compared to a “0.00077% chance of being killed during an arrest.” 116
Additionally, statistics indicate that police work has become increasingly safe. 2015 was one of the “safest years for American policing in history” as fatalities per officer, per resident, had fallen sharply. 117 Additionally, statistics confirm that, since cases like Garner and Graham were dedecided, there has been “a seventy-five percent drop in police officer
line-of-duty deaths.” 118 Although police work can be dangerous, societal
perceptions regarding these dangers are largely misplaced and do not
reflect reality. These misperceptions, however, reinforce the deferential
nature of the “objective reasonableness” test employed in § 1983 police
use of force claims, in favor of officer-defendants.

110. Moran, supra note 108, at 954.
111. John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers,
21 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 155, 167–69 (2016).
112. Id.; Khogali, supra note 13 at 110–11.
113. The Daily, Why Do So Many Traffic Stops Go Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, at 03:36, 04:15 (Nov. 1, 2021)
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/01/podcasts/the-daily/police-killings-traffic-stops.html? [https://
perma.cc/AK6D-NKHQ] (“In the most aggressive training manuals, they say point blank, every driver
could be a killer. Watch out.”); Stein et al., supra note 21; Gross, supra note 111, at 168.
114. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977).
115. Gross, supra note 111, at 169.
116. Id.
117. Daniel Bier, It Has Never Been Safer to Be a Cop, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 14, 2015, 3:27 PM), http://
www.newsweek.com/it-has-never-been-safer-be-cop-372025 [https://perma.cc/MS3E-GDX6].
118. See Gisele Galoustian, It’s Safer to be a Cop in the U.S. Today than 50 Years Ago, FLA. ATL. UNIV.
NEWS DESK (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.fau.edu/newsdesk/articles/police-deaths-study.php
[https://perma.cc/M8Z7-8L9F] (discussing results of “one of the most comprehensive assessments
of the ‘dangerousness’ of policing to date,” conducted by researchers from FAU, Arizona State, and
the University of Texas).
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In addition to the deference afforded to police officers by the “objective reasonableness” test, the doctrine of qualified immunity further
defers to officer-defendants in § 1983 police use of force cases. Qualified
immunity is “a judicially created legal doctrine that shields government
officials [such as police officers] performing discretionary duties from
civil liability in cases involving the deprivation of statutory or constitutional rights.” 119 Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity so
long as their actions do not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”120
The Court has interpreted the qualified immunity doctrine to balance
“the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distractions, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 121 The
Court has also noted that qualified immunity is meant to give police officers “breathing room” to make reasonable mistakes of fact and law. 122
Federal courts have historically applied a two-factor test when determining whether an officer-defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 123 First, they ask “whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff amount to
a constitutional violation.” 124 If so, they then determine whether the
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the officerdefendant’s misconduct. 125 Recently, the Supreme Court has afforded
this two-pronged analysis more flexibility, allowing lower courts to decide in what order to apply these steps “in light of the circumstances of
the factors of the case at hand.” 126
The qualified immunity doctrine has been subject to significant legal and practical criticism. Legally, opponents argue that the doctrine
lacks roots in common law 127 and no longer achieves the policy goals it
originally set out to achieve. 128 Practically, the qualified immunity doctrine is often a substantial impediment for civil § 1983 plaintiffs who
have difficulty in proving that a police officer, despite potentially violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, acted in spite of a “clearly estab-

119.

WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10492, POLICING THE POLICE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020).

120. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
121. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
122. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011); NOVAK, supra note 119, at 1.
123. NOVAK, supra note 119, at 2.
124. Id.
125. Id.; Callahan, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
126. NOVAK, supra note 119, at 2.
127. See Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797,
1801–03 (2018).
128. Id. at 1803–04.
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lished law.”129 Scholars are not the only individuals who are concerned
with qualified immunity’s deference in favor of the police: “Justice Sotomayor, in dissenting in several cases in which the Court found officers
were entitled to qualified immunity, expressed her disfavor . . . fearing
[qualified immunity’s] application essentially provides an absolute shield
for law enforcement officers and ‘renders the protections of the Fourth
Amendment hollow.’” 130 These qualified immunity concerns, unlike those
of police traffic stop danger discussed above, accurately reflect reality.
Recent studies confirm that federal appellate courts have been granting
qualified immunity to officer-defendants at a significantly increasing
rate, particularly in police use of excessive force cases. 131 Due to the deference given to officer-defendants by both the “objective reasonableness” test and the doctrine of qualified immunity, civil § 1983 police use
of force plaintiffs face a strenuous uphill battle in holding officers accountable for their unreasonable use of force.
Lastly, and most importantly, the current “objective reasonableness”
standard allows officers to escape liability in situations of officer-created
jeopardy. Officer-created jeopardy describes situations in which officers deliberately or recklessly create danger, escalating an interaction
with a suspect or another individual and increasing the likelihood that
fatal or excessive force will be used. 132 Officer-created jeopardy largely
arises during a police officer’s pre-seizure conduct, conduct that can
span from the moment an officer receives a dispatch call to the moment
that officer uses force. 133 However, under the current loosely defined
“objective reasonableness” test, pre-seizure conduct is not necessarily
relevant to assessing whether an officer-defendant’s use of force was
unreasonable in violation of § 1983. 134 As noted in Part I, the Supreme
Court did not define a timeline of relevant officer conduct for lower courts

129. Id. at 1814; Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional
Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1245 (2015) (noting that
the Court has used qualified immunity “to severely restrict the ability of individuals to recover for
constitutional violations that they suffer at the hands of law enforcement.”).
130. NOVAK, supra note 119, at 4.
131. See Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrea Januta & Guillermo Gomez,
Shielded, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (May 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report
/usa-police-immunity-scotus/ [https://perma.cc/YQ98-C3MR].
132. Lee, supra note 20, at 671; Lee, supra note 21, at 1388–89; Stein et al., supra note 21.
133. See Lee, supra note 20, at 671.
134. See Aaron Kimber, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure? The Relevance of an Officer’s PreSeizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 651, 654 (2004) (“The specific
set of factors that fall within [the totality of the circumstances test] is not clear, and the circuits have
split on whether pre-seizure police conduct leading up to the use of force is within its scope.”).
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to analyze when employing the “objective reasonableness” test. 135 Lower
courts are therefore free to decide what officer conduct to analyze and
may ignore pre-seizure conduct altogether. 136 If pre-seizure conduct is
ignored by federal courts when deciding whether an officer’s conduct was
reasonable within a § 1983 claim, the officer’s deliberate or reckless creation of the need for force, simply stated, is irrelevant. This Note refers to
this problem as the “officer-created jeopardy liability loophole” because,
in jurisdictions that do not deem pre-seizure conduct relevant for § 1983
reasonableness analysis, officers can use situations of officer-created
jeopardy to escape liability, despite the fact that their deliberate or reckless actions escalated the situation and increased the likelihood that excessive force would be used. Due to inherent bias against plaintiffs of color,137 extreme deference in favor of officer-defendants, 138 and the officercreated jeopardy liability loophole, 139 the current “objective reasonableness” test is incredibly problematic from the perspective of plaintiffs and
the general public.
B. From the Police Perspective
The “objective reasonableness” test employed in § 1983 police use of
force cases also presents three problems from the perspective of the police. First, due to the vagueness of the “objective reasonableness” test,
officers have little practical guidance as to what, on the ground level,
constitutes a reasonable use of force in accordance with § 1983. Second,
police use of force protocols vary significantly across departments.
Third, because the factfinders in § 1983 cases are not officers themselves, there is a problematic discrepancy between what non-officer
factfinders perceive as “objectively reasonable” force and what officerdefendants perceive as “objectively reasonable” force.
First, the vagueness of the “objective reasonableness” test allows for
wide variation in department use of force procedures while also preventing officers on the ground from being confident that their force is “reasonable” so as not to violate § 1983. Recall that when the Graham Court

135. See id.
136. See McClellan, supra note 20, at 8 (claiming that “[f]ollowing Graham v. Connor, lower courts
were left to interpret the relevant timeframe for evaluating an officer’s conduct under an excessive
force claim” and describing the different approaches that lower courts take regarding pre-seizure
conduct).
137. See supra notes 93–107 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 108–131 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
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created this test, “objective reasonableness” was not defined. 140 The Court
merely stated that an officer-defendant’s use of force should be “objectively reasonable” in light of the “totality of the circumstances.” 141 Recall
further that, although the Graham court listed a few relevant factors for
this inquiry, these factors were essentially erased by the Court in Harris. 142 This vagueness has “forced police departments to create policies
on the use of force that are unworkable.” 143 For example, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) developed a “National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on the Use of Force” intended to provide police officers with guidelines for the use of deadly and less-lethal
force. 144 This Consensus Paper articulates the IACP policy that,
[Police] officers shall use only the force that is objectively reasonable to effectively bring an incident under control, while protecting the safety of the officers and others. Officers shall use force
only when no reasonably effective alternative appears to exist
and shall use only the level of force which a reasonably prudent
officer would use under the same or similar circumstances. 145
The IACP goes on to define “objectively reasonable” as “the necessity
for using force . . . based upon the officer’s evaluation of the situation in
light of the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time
the force is used and upon what a reasonably prudent officer would use
under the same or similar situations.” 146 This definition, however, provides little concrete direction for officers to follow and merely restates
the vague language from the Graham articulation of the “objective reasonableness” test. 147 Further, the IACP model policy follows the general
trend of police department use of force standards: although departments
do give general instructions that officers are to use no more force than

140. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (announcing the test’s application to the case
and describing the contours of the test itself, failing to define “objective reasonableness”).
141. Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
142. Compare id. (stating that the reasonableness test “requires careful attention to . . . the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest . . . .”) with Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
383–85 (2007) (applying a new version of the objective reasonableness test without looking to any
factors announced in Graham).
143. Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Reasonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 486 (1994).
144. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY AND DISCUSSION PAPER ON USE
OF FORCE 2 (2020).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
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necessary, “when it comes to specifics . . . departments don’t give clear
instructions for what officers ought to do” when using force in the
field. 148 Although departments are able to set more precise, higher standards for officer use of force, doing so often creates, rather than reduces,
department liability. 149
The “objective reasonableness” test’s vagueness also produces a
problematic lack of uniformity among police department use of force
policies. In 2012, a survey of hundreds of American police departments
concluded that there is no commonly used force continuum policy and,
among the 336 departments that taught police officers which types of
force to use for different scenarios, there were 203 different variations. 150
The consistency among departmental approaches to use of force also varies based on scenario. For example, while police departments are more
consistent in training officers on what type of force to use in self-defense,
departments are incredibly varied in how they instruct officer use of force
in response to other scenarios, such as when individuals are resisting arrest. 151
In addition to these problems stemming from the vagueness of the
“objective reasonableness” test, its methodology provides police with
further cause for concern. While on the ground, officers must decide if
force is reasonable prior to using it. However, officers are not the ones
tasked with analyzing whether such force was “objectively reasonable”
after the fact when a court is deciding a § 1983 excessive force claim. 152
On the contrary, factfinders in such cases are ordinary citizens lacking
both general law enforcement training and experience as well as knowledge of how the officer-defendant perceived the circumstances surrounding their use of force. 153 Therefore, it is the public perception of
reasonableness, rather than the officer’s training-based perception that
matters for § 1983 liability. 154 However, there is a vast difference in bases for these perceptions. Lessons learned throughout extensive training, at least in theory, influence how officers perceive dangerousness
148. Dara Lind, How Do Police Departments Train Cops How to Use Force?, VOX (May 6, 2015) https://
www.vox.com/2014/9/5/6105373/police-allowed-to-force-shoot-taser-training-policy [https://perma
.cc/Z4GA-9PM2].
149. Id. (noting how departments with higher use-of-force standards are more susceptible to
lawsuits for failing to properly train officers and failing to protect the safety of officer employees).
150. Id. (discussing the results of the Terrill & Paoline study); William Terrill & Eugene A. Paoline
II., Examining Less Lethal Force Police and the Force Continuum: Results from a National Use-of-Force Study, 16
POLICE Q., July 2012, at 1, 9–15.
151. Lind, supra note 148.
152. Alpert & Smith, supra note 143, at 483–484.
153. See Mark Curtis White, Essay, Police Use of Force, 2 W. TEX. A&M U. POL, BUREAUCRACY, & JUST.
J., 2011, at 17, 17–18.
154. See id. at 18; see also Alpert & Smith, supra note 143, at 484.
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and their environments when in the line of duty, including prior to using force against an individual. 155 In contrast, citizen factfinders base
their perception of reasonableness on evidence and testimony presented in the confines of a courtroom, long after the force was used, without comparable training. The problem with this distinction is easily evident. A “well-trained officer may come to a different conclusion than [a
citizen factfinder] about what is necessary and reasonable to resolve [an]
encounter.”156 It is entirely possible for § 1983 citizen factfinders, unaware of the considerations influencing officer actions, to condemn a
particular use of force that is otherwise in accordance with police protocol. 157
The problems presented by the “objective reasonableness” standard
affect both the public and the police alike. Fortunately, the time for reforming this standard is ripe. Before explaining this Note’s proposal to
include a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness in § 1983 police
use of force analysis, it is important to analyze a recent decision of the
Supreme Court that created space for this reform.
C. City of Tahlequah v. Bond: The Story of Dominic Rollice
On August 12, 2016, Dominic Rollice was fatally shot by officers
Girdner and Vick of the Tahlequah Police Department in Oklahoma. 158
Officers responded to a 911 call from Dominic’s ex-wife, who informed
the dispatcher that Dominic was intoxicated and would not leave her
garage. 159 Shortly after officers arrived on scene and were standing near
the garage entrance, they saw Dominic “fidgeting with something in his
hands” and claimed that Dominic “appeared nervous.” 160 Officer Girdner then began gesturing with his hands and took a step toward the
garage doorway. 161 Dominic began to walk towards the back of the gar-

155. The median timeframe for basic police officer recruit training in America is eighteen
weeks, plus additional fieldwork experience. David Gutierrez, Why Police Training Must be Reformed,
HARV. POL. REV., https://iop.harvard.edu/get-involved/harvard-political-review/why-police-trainingmust-be-reformed [https://perma.cc/B3JB-SSV2] (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
156. Alpert & Smith, supra note 143, at 487; see also Lind, supra note 148 (“Often, what the public
sees as appropriate force greatly differs from what police actually do in these situations.”).
157. See Alpert & Smith, supra note 143, at 485–86. It is also worth noting that, perhaps, in light
of the increased societal focus on police accountability noted in Part I these citizen factfinders may
be more likely to find a use of force that they do not understand to be “objectively unreasonable”
within a § 1983 police excessive force claim.
158. City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (per curiam).
159. Id at 10.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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age and officers followed him, blocking his exit. 162 Once at the back of
the garage, Dominic grabbed a hammer from the nearby workbench. 163
Officers stepped back and drew their weapons in response.164 Dominic
held the hammer in one hand, slightly above his head. 165 Officers yelled
at Dominic to drop the hammer and Dominic replied by saying “[n]o.” 166
At this point, the third responding officer decided to holster his gun
and draw his taser instead. 167 Dominic claimed, “I have done nothing
wrong here, man. I’m in my house. I’m doing nothing wrong. . . I see
your taser.” 168 While still talking “relatively calmly” to the officers, Dominic pulled the hammer back behind his head. 169 Officers Girdner and
Vick opened fire. 170 As Dominic “double[d] over,” Officer Girdner fired
again because the hammer was still raised. 171 Dominic was pronounced
dead soon after. 172
After Dominic’s death, his estate filled a § 1983 claim against officers Vick and Girdner. 173 The district court granted summary judgment
for each officer-defendant on the basis of qualified immunity. 174 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed in favor of Dominic’s estate, holding that
“the reasonableness of [the officers’] actions depends both on whether the
officers were in danger at the precise moment that they used force and on
whether [their] own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force.” 175 The Tenth Circuit began
by discussing the relevancy of officer pre-seizure conduct, claiming that,
Taken together, the Graham factors as applied to the few seconds
in which Dominic was wielding a hammer would present a close
call on whether summary judgment was proper. But we need not

162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id at 11.
165. Id.
166. Bond v. City of Tahlequah, 981 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, rev’d, 142 S. Ct. 9
(2021) (per curiam).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (noting “procedural history”).
175. Id. at 816 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695,
699 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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and do not reach any conclusion on that issue because or review
is not limited to that narrow timeframe. 176
The Tenth Circuit further reasoned that situations of officer-created
jeopardy should not absolve officers of § 1983 liability, stating that the
Circuit “consider[s] whether the Graham factors were met under the totality of the circumstances, including whether the officers approached
the situation in a manner they knew or should have known would result
in the escalation of danger.” 177 According to the Tenth Circuit, the responding officers, despite knowing that Dominic was intoxicated, cornered him in the garage, blocked his exit, and used fatal force against
him all within the course of less than one minute. 178 Although Dominic
did pull a hammer behind his head, he did so in response to the officer’s
advancement with the taser. 179
On further appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals, reinstating the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of officer-defendants Vick and Girdner on the basis of qualified
immunity in a per curiam opinion. 180 Notably, the Court opened the
door regarding § 1983 “objective reasonableness” reform or, at least, declined to close it. In granting qualified immunity to the officerdefendants, the Court wrote “[w]e need not, and do not, decide whether
the officers violated the Fourth Amendment [or § 1983] in the first place,
or whether recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can
itself violate the Fourth Amendment [or § 1983].” 181
As both the Tenth Circuit’s holding and this Note’s proposed reform
suggest, pre-seizure conduct should be analyzed by federal courts
throughout § 1983 police use of force inquiries and the officer-created
jeopardy liability loophole should be closed. The reform discussed below,
creating a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, would, among
other benefits, enable officers to be held liable under § 1983 for recklessly
creating situations that require deadly force.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
Id. at 816.
Id. at 823.
Id.
City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 11.
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III. PROPOSING A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF UNREASONABLENESS
WITHIN § 1983 ANALYSIS
To alleviate the problems faced by the public and police alike, the
“objective reasonableness” test utilized in § 1983 police use of force claims
should include a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness. This presumption would apply solely and specifically to cases involving the use
of force in situations of officer-created jeopardy. Among other benefits,
this presumption would allow civil plaintiffs—like Dominic Rollice’s estate—the chance to assert that an officer-defendant’s use of force was the
result of the officer’s own reckless or deliberate conduct, which would increase civil plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in § 1983 claims and close the
officer-created jeopardy liability loophole. This Part begins by explaining
how this rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness will work in practice. Next, this Part will address potential counterarguments that may be
raised against this reform. In conclusion, this Part will explore some of
the benefits that this proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness will bring to civil plaintiffs, officer-defendants, and society at large.
A. Rebuttable Presumption of Unreasonableness
Generally, a legal presumption is a “rule of law which requires the
assumption of a fact from another fact or set of facts” and “has the effect
of shifting either the burden of proof or the burden of [production].” 182
Specifically, a rebuttable presumption is a presumption “which must . . .
be made once certain facts have been proved, and which is thus said to
establish a prima facie conclusion; it may be rebutted . . . through the introduction of contrary evidence, but if it is not, it becomes conclusive.”183
The proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness begins,
therefore, with the § 1983 plaintiff establishing “certain facts” that show
the officer-defendant deliberately or recklessly escalated a situation in
the moments leading up to an arrest or otherwise increased the likelihood that fatal or excessive force would be used.184
A § 1983 police use of force plaintiff can point to various sources and
circumstances in establishing the existence of officer-created jeopardy,

182. Presumption, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2016).
183. Rebuttable Presumption, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2016).
184. The purpose of this note is not to decide specifically how this proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness should be created. However, it should be noted that Congress could
embed this proposal within an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself or this presumption could be
created within federal § 1983 use of force precedent.
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triggering the rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness. For example, a § 1983 plaintiff could argue through the presentation of direct or
circumstantial evidence that the officer-defendant knew or should have
known that their conduct would result in the escalation of danger, replicating the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Bond. 185 A § 1983 plaintiff
could also point to police use of force policies that prohibit or contradict
the officer-defendant’s conduct in question. Additionally, a § 1983 plaintiff could show that the officer-defendant took an “unnecessary tactical
risk,” highlighting that the officer’s actions, although technically justifying the officer’s use of fatal or excessive force, were wholly unnecessary
or reckless. 186 Though there would be various ways to trigger this rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, each would allow § 1983 police
use of force plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence of the officerdefendant’s pre-seizure conduct, making such evidence relevant within
the numerous federal courts that have historically ignored it. 187
Once a § 1983 police use of force plaintiff presents evidence that the
case involved officer-created jeopardy, the trier of fact would determine
whether this evidence is sufficient to trigger the proposed rebuttable
presumption of unreasonableness. This determination should not be
subject to a rigid definition or test. Instead, this determination should
be a common-sense inquiry, giving the trier of fact flexibility to find
sufficient escalation in numerous cases involving various police tactics
and types of force. If the trier of fact determines that the plaintiff’s evidence constitutes a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy, the
court would presume that the officer-defendant’s use of force was objectively unreasonable, in violation of § 1983.
Before discussing how this presumption could be rebutted by the
officer-defendant, it is worth pausing to note the burden of proof that
plaintiffs bear in § 1983 trials. In § 1983 claims, like most civil claims,
plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their case by a preponderance of
the evidence. 188 This burden “allows both parties to ‘share the risk of er-

185. See Bond v. City of Tahlequah, 981 F.3d 808, 816, 822–24 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. granted,
judgement rev’d, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam).
186. See Stein et al., supra note 21 (discussing “tactical risks” taken by officers in the cases of
Coltin LeBlanc and Anthony Vega Cruz (jumping onto the door of a moving car and running
around a fleeing car, respectively) which, although technically justified the responding officers’ use
of fatal force, were “unnecessary.”)
187. See Kimber, supra note 134, at 653–54; McClellan, supra note 20, at 8–9 (stating that
“[f]ollowing Graham v. Connor, lower courts were left to interpret the relevant timeframe for evaluating an officer’s conduct under an excessive force claim” and describing the different approaches
that lower courts take regarding pre-seizure conduct).
188. See United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 930 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The preponderance
standard of evidence is…the normal standard in civil cases.”).
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ror in roughly equal fashion.’” 189 In the context of police use of force civil
claims, the plaintiff is required to prove that it is “more likely than not”
that the officer-defendant deprived them of their Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, in violation of
§ 1983. 190 The proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness
would not alter this burden in any fashion, nor displace this burden of
proof from the plaintiff to the officer-defendant. If, however, the trier
of fact found a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy based on evidence presented by a plaintiff, the officer-defendant would have the
burden of production to rebut the presumption that their use of force
was unreasonable in violation of § 1983, in accordance with Federal Rule
of Evidence 301. 191
At this stage, the officer-defendant could rebut the presumption of
unreasonableness in a number of ways. The officer-defendant could
present evidence that their conduct was in accordance with department
protocol, or demonstrate that the circumstances justified tactical risks
taken or that their tactical risks were not otherwise “unnecessary.” Additionally and importantly, officer-defendants could rebut this presumption of unreasonableness by showing that, although they may
have deliberately or recklessly escalated the situation involving the §
1983 plaintiff, they took sufficient subsequent steps to de-escalate the
situation prior to using force.
In the International Association of Chiefs of Police National Consensus Paper, discussed above, the IACP defined “de-escalation” as
Taking action or communicating . . . during a potential force
encounter in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reduce
the immediacy of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to resolve the situation without the
use of force or with a reduction in the [degree of] force necessary. 192
Officer de-escalation can take numerous forms, including increasing distance between the officer and citizen-subject, attempting to calm
the citizen-subject, waiting for backup, avoiding deadly force when the

189. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
190. See id.
191. FED. R. EVID. 301 (“[T]he party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption.”).
192. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 144, at 2.
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citizen-subject is not armed, and being compassionate. 193 The trier of
fact’s determination of whether the officer-defendant has sufficiently
rebutted the presumption, with attention to proof of de-escalation, is a
common sense inquiry—much like the inquiry that triggers the presumption in the first place. This affords officer-defendants the same
flexibility in rebutting the presumption of unreasonableness as plaintiffs receive in triggering it.
B. Counterarguments and Considerations
Potentially meritorious counterarguments to a § 1983 rebuttable
presumption of unreasonableness can be largely categorized as critiquing either its legal implications or its practicality. This Note address
both categories of counterarguments in turn.
First, some may criticize the presumption on “legal” grounds, arguing that it is unnecessary or duplicitous in light of the doctrine of statecreated danger. The state-created danger doctrine developed throughout lower court decisions following the Supreme Court’s holding in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services that, while the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not guarantee minimal
levels of safety and security for citizens, 194 there may be an exception to
this rule for situations of “state-created danger,” in which the government actor in question could be in violation of § 1983. 195 While it is true
that the state-created danger doctrine often arises in the context of §
1983 civil suits 196 and creates liability for a state actor, such as a police
officer who exacerbates or creates danger faced by a private citizen, 197
this doctrine is problematic in itself and, regardless, is conceptually distinct from the rebuttable presumption proposed.
Although the state-created danger doctrine developed from lower
court interpretations of Supreme Court dicta, the Supreme Court has
yet to recognize it. 198 Additionally, although the doctrine has been rec193. Lee, supra note 20, at 662; Christopher L. McFarlin, Integrating De-Escalation Techniques Into
Policing, POLICE1 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.police1.com/american-military-university/articles
/integrating-de-escalation-techniques-into-policing-YumZSki33Ak5qSJz/ [https://perma.cc/YBM8TYPR].
194. 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
195. Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Annotation, “State-Created Danger”, or Similar Theory, as Basis for Civil
Rights Action Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 37 (2000).
196. Christopher M. Eisenhauer, Police Action and the State-Created Danger Doctrine: A Proposed
Uniform Test, 120 PA. ST. L. REV. 893, 894 (2016).
197. Recent Case: Cook v. Hopkins, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2020), https://blog.harvardlaw
review.org/recent-case-_cook-v-hopkins_/ [https://perma.cc/V6MQ-REAF].
198. See Eisenhauer, supra note 196, at 893–94, 897, 916.

950

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:4

ognized by all federal circuit courts, these courts apply the doctrine in a
variety of ways to numerous distinct factual circumstances, leading to
inconsistency and unfairness for civil litigants. 199 Indeed, many critics
have called to make uniform or otherwise reform the state-created danger doctrine. 200 Due to this lack of uniformity in both application and
recognition, the state-created danger doctrine does not provide any additional likelihood of success for victims of police use of excessive force.
Aside from its problems, the state-created danger doctrine is dissimilar from this Note’s proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness in numerous ways. First, the state-created danger doctrine implicates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 201 rather than
the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures, which is the right implicated in § 1983 cases involving police use of force. 202 If a plaintiff victimized by police use of excessive
force wanted to invoke the state-created danger doctrine to hold an officer liable for their creation or escalation of such force, the plaintiff
would have to allege a separate deprivation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights within a § 1983 claim. This Note’s proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness requires no separate allegation. Instead, the proposed rebuttable presumption applies the conceptual benefits of an ideal, uniform, state-created danger doctrine to
all cases of police use of excessive force brought under §1983. The proposed presumption in cases of officer-created jeopardy couches an ideal
state-created danger doctrine within the existing Fourth Amendment
“objective reasonableness” test utilized in § 1983 police use of force
claims.
Secondly, critics of the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness may raise an additional “legal” counterargument that the
presumption is too vague and does not provide the trier of fact with significant guideposts to determine when an officer-defendant has sufficiently escalated the altercation to trigger the presumption of unreason199. Id. at 893.
200. See generally id. (noting the various applications of the state-created danger doctrine and
proposing a uniform rule); Milena Shtelmakher, Police Misconduct and Liability: Applying the StateCreated Danger Doctrine to Hold Police Officers Accountable for Responding Inadequately to Domestic Violence Situations, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2010) (calling for a Congressionally-created national
standard to make uniform the state-created danger doctrine to benefit victims of domestic violence); Matthew D. Barrett, Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Consistent “StateCreated Danger” Analysis for Establishing Constitutional Violations Under Section 1983, 37 VAL. U. L. REV.
177, 179 (2002) (proposing a model judicial test to resolve the “varying degrees of inconsistencies
among the federal circuits[’]” application of the state-created danger doctrine).
201. See Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1168 (2005).
202. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
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ableness, or when an officer-defendant has sufficiently de-escalated the
altercation to rebut this presumption. While the proposed rebuttable
presumption provides no rigid definitions or tests for “escalation” or
“de-escalation,” it does so intentionally to further federal court flexibility in applying this presumption to various factual circumstances. Although officers are largely aware of the terms “escalation” and “deescalation,” “escalation” is not subject to the same technical treatment
as “de-escalation,” as is made evident throughout various police protocols and policies such as the IACP National Consensus Policy. 203 Indeed,
“de-escalation,” in a sense, is responsive to “escalation.”
While this Note could propose that federal courts adopt a more rigid definition of “de-escalation” such as the definition provided by the
IACP, doing so presents complications. A rigid “de-escalation” definition would limit the ability of the officer-defendants to: (1) provide evidence of techniques the officer felt would sufficiently de-escalate the specific situation; (2) point to local policies and protocols in support of their
use of force; and (3) rebut a presumption of unreasonableness. Rigidly defining “de-escalation” without similarly defining “escalation” would not
only shift the burden of production toward the officer-defendant but
would also make this burden harder to meet, contradicting the purpose
of the preponderance of the evidence burden that both parties equally
“share the risk of error.” 204
Additionally, potential arguments that this proposed presumption
of unreasonableness fails to adequately guide the trier of fact ignore the
fact that the current “objective reasonableness” test employed in § 1983
police use of force claims, as discussed in Part II (B), is equally vague,
providing no guideposts for the trier of fact to follow other than that the
“totality of the circumstances” should be considered and that officers
“often make split-second decisions” and are impliedly entitled to deference. 205 In other words, the proposed rebuttable presumption does not
change the status quo. The trier of fact still must make a common-sense
inquiry but, if the presumption is applied, the focus of this inquiry
shifts from whether the officer’s use of force was “objectively reasonable” in light of the “totality of the circumstances” 206 to whether the officer-defendant unnecessarily escalated and, if so, de-escalated the situation. At its minimum, the proposed rebuttable presumption does not
take anything away from the current “objective reasonableness” test.
Indeed, this standard is still applied if a § 1983 plaintiff chooses not to
203.
204.
205.
206.

See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 144.
Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
Id.
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pursue the presumption, fails to establish a prima facie case of officercreated jeopardy, or the case is rebutted by the officer-defendant. If invoked, however, the proposed rebuttable presumption gives the trier of
fact an additional guidepost, allowing them to assess the officer’s preseizure conduct if the § 1983 plaintiff presents it in support of a prima
facie finding of officer-created jeopardy. 207
Critics of this proposed presumption may raise two additional
counterarguments, asserting that a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness is impractical because: (1) § 1983 plaintiffs will not have access to evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case of officercreated jeopardy; and (2) the presumption problematically strips officers of legal protections, decreasing their use of force generally and,
therefore, increasing the hazards that officers face in the line of duty.
In response to the first concern, the current state of law enforcement surveillance technology employed by both the police and the public can aid § 1983 plaintiffs in establishing a prima facie case of officercreated jeopardy by highlighting an officer-defendant’s reckless or deliberate escalation. As discussed in Part I, body cameras and social media “viral videos” are increasingly used in criminal and civil police use of
force cases. 208 The most recent Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics study on police use of body cameras revealed that forty-seven
percent of general-purpose law enforcement agencies nationwide had
acquired body cameras. 209 Roughly eighty percent of these agencies
stated that one of the primary reasons for their body camera acquisition
was increased evidence quality. 210 There is no indication that this increased acquisition and use of surveillance technology by the police will
falter in the near future as calls for increased surveillance technology
and body camera use now dominate conversations regarding policing
reform. 211 Currently, seven states mandate the use of body-worn cam-

207. Indeed, some scholars have noted that courts should analyze officer pre-seizure conduct
in accordance with the “totality of the circumstances” in which the current § 1983 “objective reasonableness” test analyzes officer conduct. See, e.g., Michalos, supra note 71, 1062–66; Michael
Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of the Circumstances Relevant to
Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261,
275–79 (2003).
208. See Kansara, supra note 78 (“There is a ‘huge increase’ in the number of clients [claiming
excessive force] who are coming in with filmed evidence.”); Dakin Andone, In One Week There Were
at Least 9 Instances of Police Using Excessive Force Caught on Camera, CNN, (June 8, 2020, 5:05 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/police-excessive-force-us-protests/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VWP9-6FAW].
209. SHELLEY S. HYLAND, U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU JUST. STAT., NCJ 251775, BODY-WORN
CAMERAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2016).
210. Id.
211. See Norwood, supra note 74.
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eras by all law enforcement officers within the state. 212 Only one of these
states had enacted this body-camera mandate prior to May 2020. 213
Additionally, while direct surveillance footage of an officerdefendant’s use of force and pre-seizure conduct would undoubtedly be
beneficial in a § 1983 claim, the lack of such evidence is not dispositive
for the claim or for the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness. If wearing a body camera or having it turned on were required
under a given officer-defendant’s departmental policies, a § 1983 plaintiff could cite this failure while establishing that the officer deliberately
or recklessly escalated the situation. This rebuttable presumption
would, therefore, further incentivize officer use of body cameras if they
were under a duty to do so, subjecting them to potential legal liability
rather than merely internal, departmental repercussions. In the alternative, if the officer-defendant was under no obligation to wear or operate a body camera and no footage was available, the lack of digital evidence would not necessarily prevent a § 1983 plaintiff from establishing
a presumption of unreasonableness. The plaintiff could still present
other forms of evidence such as non-body camera footage and eyewitness statements. If the trier of fact determines that this evidence establishes a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy, the officer-defendant
can rebut this triggered presumption of unreasonableness through nonsurveillance evidence of their own.
The second concern, that such a presumption would problematically strip officers of legal protections and increase safety hazards, is similarly unsupported. A rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness in
situations of officer-created jeopardy would not strip officers of legal
protection. Although officers may be held liable at an increased rate for
situations of officer-created jeopardy, the proposed presumption does
not displace the “objective reasonableness” test as it currently exists,
nor does it displace the deferential doctrine of qualified immunity. As
stated, the “objective reasonableness” test would still apply in three situations: (1) the § 1983 plaintiff chose not to attempt to trigger the rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness by not presenting evidence establishing that the officer-defendant’s deliberate or reckless conduct
escalated the situation; (2) the § 1983 plaintiff attempted to trigger the
presumption but did not sufficiently establish a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy; or (3) the § 1983 plaintiff’s prima facie case was
rebutted by the officer-defendant. The only situation in which the officer212. Body-Worn Camera Laws Database, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 30, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/body-worn-cameras-interactivegraphic.aspx [https://perma.cc/X9NE-LECY].
213. See id.
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defendant would be held liable is where the § 1983 plaintiff chose to pursue the rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, if the trier of fact
found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of officer-created
jeopardy, and if the officer-defendant failed to adequately rebut the
prima facie case.
Additionally, officer-defendants would still receive the legal shield
of the deferential doctrine of qualified immunity. An officer-defendant
is still free to assert that their actions, even if violating the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, were not in violation of “clearly established”
law. 214 But, under this proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, the § 1983 plaintiff has the opportunity to simultaneously present evidence in support of a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy. If unrebutted, this presumes that the officer-defendant’s conduct
was in violation of § 1983 or, in other words, in violation of “clearly established law.” 215 The proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, therefore, does not strip police officers of legal “shields.” Instead, it gives § 1983 plaintiffs an additional “sword” to present evidence
of officer pre-seizure conduct and close the officer-created jeopardy liability loophole.
Still, one may argue that this additional “sword” tips the scales too
far in favor of § 1983 plaintiffs, and that officers would be fearful of liability and, as a result, less likely to use force when truly necessary. The
argument that police officers will use less force when fearful of liability
seems weak when looking to studies, discussed in Part I, that found no
significant statistical decline in officer use of force when officers were
mandated to wear body cameras.216 Further, perhaps a net decrease in
the use of fatal and other forms of force by police is normatively good
for society. 217 Lastly, one of the many benefits of this proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, discussed below, is an increased
incentive for de-escalation. Theoretically, if de-escalation tactics are pri-

214. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230–232 (noting the current two-part qualified immunity test employed by federal courts).
215. Id. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
216. See Norwood, supra note 74.
217. See Harmon, supra note 68, at 1120 (proposing a reform limiting officer use of force to (1)
facilitate institutions of criminal law; (2) protect public order; and (3) protect the officer from physical harm; noting that, even if an officer’s use of force is justified within one of these factors, it still
may be excessive or unreasonable); Roge Karma, We Train Police to Be Warriors–and Then Send Them
Out to Be Social Workers, VOX (July 31, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/31/21334190/whatpolice-do-defund-abolish-police-reform-training [https://perma.cc/WQM8-4WEP] (discussing the
“mismatch” between officer training which largely emphasizes force and the job of policing in
which force is not needed to a large extent, and the “devastating consequences” that this mismatch
produces).
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oritized and incentivized, officers would not need to use force to the extent
they currently do, and the use that remains will be smaller in degree.
C. The Benefits of a Rebuttable Presumption of Unreasonableness in
Situations of Officer-Created Jeopardy
Implementing the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness would solve many problems associated with the current “objective reasonableness” test employed in § 1983 police use of force claims and
would create numerous benefits for both plaintiffs and officer-defendants.
First, the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness
would provide clearer guidance to officers in the field, resolving some
of the vagueness concerns of the current “objective reasonableness”
test. 218 The triggering of the proposed presumption and the officerdefendant’s ability to rebut it turn on the sufficiency of the officerdefendant’s “escalation” or “de-escalation,” rather than the “objective
reasonableness” of their use of force. Although the proposed presumption does not rigidly define these terms, they are often defined within
policing policies and are the frequent subject matter of police training.
Officers are far more familiar, therefore, with what escalation and deescalation look like at the ground level than an “objectively reasonable”
use of force.
Second, the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness
incentivizes the use of surveillance and recording technology, such as
body cameras, and de-escalation tactics. If an officer-defendant is under internal or departmental mandate to wear body cameras or have
them turned on at a given time, § 1983 plaintiffs can cite the officerdefendant’s failure to do so in proving a prima facie case of officercreated jeopardy which, if established and unrebutted, would create external legal liability for an officer-defendant. Further, the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness places strong emphasis on
officer de-escalation. While officer-defendants can rebut a prima facie
case of officer-created jeopardy simply by producing evidence that they
did not escalate the altercation, evidence that they de-escalated the altercation, even after escalating it, can protect them from § 1983 liability.
This de-escalation emphasis parallels an increase in de-escalation buyin and training from police departments throughout the nation. 219
218. See supra notes 140–157 and accompanying text.
219. Tom Jackman & Dan Morse, Police De-Escalation Training Gaining Renewed Clout as Law Enforcement Seeks to Reduce Killings, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com
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Third, the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness
diminishes some of the inherent bias against § 1983 plaintiffs of color. 220 The current “objective reasonableness” standard fails to recognize
systematic errors caused by racial biases that affect police judgments of
culpability and fails to protect individuals who have the misfortune to
be stereotyped. 221 Although the proposed rebuttable presumption does
not displace the “objective reasonableness” test, it provides § 1983 plaintiffs, including plaintiffs of color, with another avenue to establish officer-defendant liability. If the § 1983 plaintiff can sufficiently establish
a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy, unless sufficiently rebutted, the officer-defendant is presumptively liable under § 1983 for depriving the plaintiff of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. In such a case, the inherently biased “objective reasonableness” test need not occur.
Lastly, and most importantly, the proposed rebuttable presumption
of unreasonableness decreases the deference historically enjoyed by officer-defendants by incorporating officer pre-seizure conduct and closing the officer-created jeopardy liability loophole. 222 This Note’s reform
offers § 1983 plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence of the actions that officer-defendants took leading up to their use of force to establish a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy. If unrebutted, §
1983 plaintiffs can hold officer-defendants liable for uses of force that
they recklessly or deliberately created. This proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness will result in greater access to justice for
§ 1983 police use of force plaintiffs and could result in more equitable and
just interactions between members of the general public and the police.
CONCLUSION
The “objective reasonableness” test employed within § 1983 police
use of force claims presents numerous problems from the perspective
of both the public and police. These problems, including vagueness, inherent bias, and imbalanced deference, are especially relevant given the
renewed societal focus on police accountability due in large part to social movements and surveillance technologies. Incorporating a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness within the current “objective rea-

/local/deescalation-training-police/2020/10/27/3a345830-14a8-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb_story.html
[https://perma.cc/J4Q8-ZU22]; see also INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 144, at 3.
220. See supra notes 93–107 and accompanying text.
221. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 93, at 296.
222. See supra notes 108–136 and accompanying text.
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sonableness” test would allow § 1983 plaintiffs to present evidence establishing a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy. If sufficiently
established, an officer-defendant would have the opportunity to rebut
this presumption by highlighting how their actions either did not escalate the altercation with the plaintiff, were in accordance with policy, or
constituted sufficient de-escalation. This presumption would reduce
inherent bias, balance deference, and provide clearer direction for police officers within § 1983 use of force claims. This presumption would
also incentivize officer de-escalation, promote the use of surveillance
technologies like body cameras, incorporate officer pre-seizure conduct
into the legal analysis, and close the officer-created liability loophole.
Under the proposed rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, situations of officer-created jeopardy can be used as a “sword” for the § 1983
police use of force plaintiff rather than as a “shield” for officer-defendants.

